Peer-to-Peer Desktop Grid (P2PDG) has emerged as a pervasive cyber-infrastructure tackling many largescale applications with high impacts. As a burgeoning research area, P2PDG can support numerous applications, including scientific computing, file sharing, web services, and virtual organization for collaborative activities and projects. To handle trustworthiness issues of these services, trust and reputation schemes are proposed to establish trust among peers in P2PDG. In this paper, we propose a robust group trust management system, called H-Trust, inspired by the H-index aggregation technique. Leveraging the robustness of the H-index algorithm under incomplete and uncertain circumstances, H-Trust offers a robust personalized reputation evaluation mechanism for both individual and group trusts with minimal communication and computation overheads. We present the H-Trust scheme in five phases, including trust recording, local trust evaluation, trust query phase, spatial-temporal update phase, and group reputation evaluation phases. The rationale for its design, the analysis of the algorithm are further investigated. To validate the performance of H-Trust scheme, we designed the H-Trust simulator HTrust-Sim to conduct multi-agent-based simulations. Simulation results demonstrate that H-Trust is robust and can identify and isolate malicious peers in large scale systems even when a large portion of peers are malicious.
Introduction
Because of its salient features of extreme scalability, flexibility, self-configuration, self-organization, and resilience to failures, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) overlay network paradigm has been hailed in both industry and academia. P2P systems have made tremendous progress in fundamental data lookup and content management [1−3] . The emerging convergence of grid system enabled large-scale application and made significant impacts on science computing. Combining the grid technologies and the P2P solutions, Peer-toPeer Desktop Grid (P2PDG) has emerged as a pervasive cyber-infrastructure tackling many large-scale applications with high impacts, such as SETI@Home and DNA@Home. As a burgeoning research area, P2PDG can support numerous applications, including scientific computing, file sharing, Web services, and virtual organization for collaborative activities and projects. Unlike the single grid systems, in P2PDG, every peer acts as both a client and a server. However, because peers are autonomous and anonymous without centralized administration and common ownership, the P2P Grid is inherently insecure.
Reputation-based systems are proposed to establish trust among peers in P2P systems [4] . In a reputation system, each entity's history behaviors is used to predict how it is going to behave in the future. In general, a good reputation system should have low computational and message overhead, accurate reputation aggregation, and fast reputation interference and dissemination speed.
In a P2PDG environment, users perform large-scale and cooperative computational applications. Trust and reputation issues become prominent. In P2PDG, most computing jobs are accomplished by work groups. However, nearly all the existing trust schemes and reputation systems did not consider the group reputation issues for collaborative applications and resource sharing. In addition, most of the current reputation schemes meet the dilemma between the accuracy in reputation aggregation and the communication/computing overloads. To address these issues, we propose a robust and lightweight group trust management system, called H-Trust (the preliminary work of H-Trust is published in [5] ) inspired by the H-index aggregation approach [6] . Leveraging the robustness of the H-index algorithm under incomplete and uncertain circumstances, H-Trust offers a robust reputation evaluation mechanism for both individual and group trusts with minimal communication and computation overheads. Peers in our system only store information they explicitly can use for their own benefit. H-Trust further considers spatial and temporal information to update and adapt trust scores for an individual and groups.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the related work and taxonomy for the existing trust and reputation systems. Section 4 presents the H-Trust scheme in five phases. The H-Trust aggregation algorithm is presented and illustrated. Section 5 presents the simulation results to evaluate the effectiveness, robustness, and security of the proposed scheme. Section 6 concludes the paper and presents the ongoing and future work.
Related Work
The most popular reputation system is the feedback scheme used by the eBay [7] . Customers give feedbacks for their trading partners with 1, −1 or 0 rating after each transaction. eBay is a centralized reputation system and there is a reputation server to store and manage each entity's reputation.
Xiong and Liu developed PeerTrust, a reputationbased trust supporting framework [8] . PeerTrust uses five trust parameters to compute trustworthiness of peers. And a general trust metric on how to combine these parameters is also presented. PeerTrust model was implemented in a distributed P2P network and the authors conducted simulations to evaluate the effectiveness and cost of PeerTrust model. The EigenTrust scheme proposed by Kamvar et al. presents a method to compute a global trust value for each peer in the network by calculating the eigenvector of a normalized local trust rating matrix [9] . EigenTrust gathers the entire systems history to yield a global reputation for each peer. Simulations under various attack models show EigenTrust significantly decrease the risk.
Zhou et al. developed the PowerTrust system for DHT-based P2P networks [10] . The system gathers locally peer feedback information and aggregates them to the global reputation value. PowerTrust dynamically selects a small set of power nodes that are most reputable to increase the reputation aggregation accuracy and computation speed. Their group has also built the GossipTrust system in network by its gossip-based aggregation algorithms [11] . GossipTrust use Bloom filters to achieve efficient reputation storage.
Song et al. built the FuzzyTrust System [12] . They proposed a P2P reputation system based on fuzzy logic inferences. They tested the FuzzyTrust system using eBay transaction data. In the experiment, the paper compared the performance of FuzzyTrust and EigenTrust to show that FuzzyTrust is efficient and robust.
Liang and Shi proposed PET, a personalized economic-based trust model for the P2P resource sharing [13] . PET model consists of two major components: reputation calculation and risk evaluation. Their conclusion is that risk is important in designing a personalized trust system as well as reputation rating.
NICE project is a trust inference scheme in distributed P2P networks [14] . It models the network as trust graph. NICE uses the trust inference among the trust graph to infer indirect trust. The idea of trust graph and the low overhead trust information search and inference algorithms are the major contribution of this paper.
Ali Aydm Selcuk and his colleague proposed a personalized trust management system to calculate trust rating and identify the malicious peers in a P2P network [15] . In their system, the users make record and then compute trust score by using local history transactions information. They conduct experimental simulation and the results show that the proposed system is accurate and effective.
Zhao and Li proposed a trust vector based trust management scheme (VectorTrust) for aggregation of distributed trust scores [16] . VectorTrust uses a distributed Bellman-Ford based algorithm for fast trust score aggregation. On average, VectorTrust converges fast (about O(lg N ) iterations) and involves low computational complexity (about O(lg N ) communication overheads).
Some recent work tried to quantitatively model the behavior of the honest and dishonest peers in trust systems [17−18] . Other works with a relevant scope include [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Some overviews and surveys for reputation and trust management systems are given in [4, [25] [26] [27] [28] .
Taxonomy
As an attempt to formulate taxonomy for reputation and trust management systems, we classify some major existing reputation and trust systems into a quadrant of taxonomy as shown in Table 1 according to rating (global or personalized) and aggregation (full or selective) mechanisms. 
Global Reputation vs. Personalized Trust Rating.
Generally, reputation is the public's opinion for an entity. It is objective. While trust is personalized and subjective reflecting an individual's opinion. The goal of global reputation is to define a global trust value for each peer in the network. In global reputation systems, the reputation of an entity is based on the opinions from the general peer population, which is public and visible through all over the network [7−12] . A global reputation system calculates the local trust rating score of a peer into a global reputation in the network. It provides rather high reputation accuracy. The global reputation system is dominant in the centralized networks. However, in an open and decentralized P2P environment, peers will not have any such centralized authority to maintain and distribute reputation information. Personalized trust system was proposed to solve reputation issue in distributed P2P network [5, [13] [14] 16] . In Personalized Trust Rating systems, the peer has selfpolicing trust on other peers, rather than obtaining a global reputation value for each peer. One peer has different reputation in different peers' database. Therefore, this kind of trust is considered personalized.
Full Aggregation vs. Selective Aggregation. From view of information aggregation approaches, we divide the reputation systems into full-aggregation reputation system and selective-aggregation reputation system. A full-aggregation reputation system calculates the reputation score of a peer by considering the opinions from all other peers who have interacted or non-direct interacted with this peer [7] [8] [9] 11, 13, 16] . Usually a full aggregation reputation system is with high accuracy. However, the aggregation approach involves a trade-off between the accuracy and overload. In any unstructured P2P network, the overload of fully reputation aggregation is quite heavy when the network grows very large. In addition, the reputation convergence speed is not so fast. Most of the cases, reputation aggregation is derived from a subset of the existing opinions in a distributed P2P network which we call selective aggregation [5, 10, 12, 14] . We believe a proper classification of reputation and trust management systems will enable researchers to develop efficient solutions to address trust issues. Using this taxonomy, our proposed H-Trust scheme belongs to personalized trust rating system based on selective aggregation
H-Trust Scheme
The H-Trust scheme is implemented in five phases. The trust recording phase records the information of the past services in service history table which is maintained in the DHT-based overlay network. In local trust evaluation phase, a local trust score is calculated by a local trust manager using weighted trust aggregation algorithm. The trust query phase is required when the trust information is not available locally. The credibility factors of the responses and H-Index aggregation is proposed in this phase to yield individual's personalized trust rating. The spatial-temporal update phase is activated periodically to renew the local trust scores and credibility factors. The most significant and novel phase is the group reputation evaluation phase where we propose the first approach to aggregate the group reputation using the H-Trust algorithm. The details of these functional phases are presented in the subsequent subsections.
Trust Records
In H-Trust system, we use the Local Service History Table ( LSHT) to record the history of past transactions or services information in each peer. Every peer maintains an LSHT for other peers which it had interactions with in the past as illustrated in Table 2 . The trust rating for one peer towards the other is based on the statistics collected from its LSHT. The information recorded in the Local Service History Table includes remote peer ID, service date, service importance and service quality. More recent service activities should have a greater impact on a peer's trust score than the older ones. The importance of a service is introduced in H-Trust system as an important context that should be incorporated to weigh the feedback for that service. It can act as a defense against some of the subtle malicious attacks where a service provider gains a good reputation by being honest for smaller and less important services and tries to make profit by being dishonest for critical services.
The service quality rating may be a binary value ("0" represents dishonest transaction and "1" represents honest transaction) in some other schemes like Ali's P2Prep [15] or a continuous scale (e.g., [0, 1]). Dellarocas concluded that binary reputation mechanisms will not function well and the resulting market outcome will be unfair if judgment is inferred from knowledge of the sum of positive and negative ratings alone [29] . And the continuous scale is complex for the local peers to rank a service. So we extend the service quality score from binary value and continuous scale to 5 grades rating in a scaled integer of 1 to 5.
Local Trust Ratings
Once relevant service history information has been gathered and stored in LSHT, individual peers may use different local inference algorithms to derive trust values. Table 3 shows an example Local Trust Rating Table (LTRT) maintained in peer i in the network. Peer i calculates and keeps all the trust ratings towards the other peers of the network locally. We do not limit the Local Trust Rating aggregation functions here. Applying different functions to LSHT allows a peer to calculate a rating best suited for the given situation. Some typical approaches to calculate the local trust ratings are given in [12, 15] . 
P2P
Grid systems involve numerous peers, where a peer often has no direct transaction experience with some peers and so that it cannot record all other peers' information in its LSHT. Therefore, it leads to that the trust information towards some peers is not available in LTRT. For example, the local peer i has no direct transaction experience for remote peer j in peer i's Local Service History Table, so peer i cannot derive trust rating for peer j in its Local Trust Rating Table. This case is illustrated in Table 3 . In such a case, the H-Trust infrastructure has to query other peers for the necessary information over the network, i.e., to activate the trust query phase.
Trust Query
The trust query phase must rely on collective opinions from the other peers, introducing new challenges. When replying the query, a malicious peer may make false statements about another peer's service due to jealousy or other malicious motives. One trust and reputation system has to accurately filter out such untrustworthy recommendation opinions. Furthermore, the query phase is rather time consuming and possibly incurs heavy overheads when high accuracy or updated reputation is desired. So the major concerns with trust systems are to guarantee the validity of opinions and reduce the computing overload.
To address these issues, recommenders' credibility factors must be introduced and critically assessed. The feedback from those peers with higher credibility factors should be weighted more than those with lower credibility. Credibility factors eliminate dishonest recommendation and prevent malicious peers from lying. To reduce the overload, the H-Trust system queries the whole network, yet only considers partially qualified peers' opinions, which are a subset of all the peers.
The credibility of the responses is evaluated according to the past records of the respondents. The results of the past references of the other peers are recorded in every peer's Local Credibility Rating Table (LCRT) as shown in Table 4 , which is managed as the similar manner as the Local Service History Table. This means there are three tables in every local peer: Local Service History Table, Local Trust Rating Table and  Local Credibility Rating Table as shown in Fig.1 . For any new joint peer, the credibility factor is set as 5 (default value). The query threshold is proposed in H-Trust to reduce the aggregation overload. The query threshold T specifies the boundary of responses to be considered in a queried trust calculation. It is set depending on network environment. When M responses to a trust query arrive, the querying peer account all the responses. Among them, N opinions from senders whose credibility ratings are greater than T are selected. In our illustrated example, peer i query to the network for peer j's trust rating, and it accounts all the replies. In this example, we set query threshold T = 7, and we get the qualified replies as shown in Fig.2. 
Trust Aggregation
After filtering out opinions from dishonest peers by query threshold T , H-Trust then further aggregates these opinions to yield a proper trust rating. Belonging to the selective aggregation category, it aggregates the selective opinions obtained in the trust query phase into local trust ratings.
H-Trust algorithm is inspired by Jorge E. Hirsch's Hirsch Index (H-index) concept [6] . The H-index is an index that quantifies both the actual scientific productivity and the apparent scientific impact of a scientist, considering the set of the scientist's most cited papers and the number of citations that they have received in other people's publications [30] . We define H-Trust aggregation algorithm as follows. The basic concept is illustrated in Fig.3 . 
Definition 1 (H-Trust Aggregation). A peer i

has trust rating T ij = H towards peer j if H of the qualified N peers have at least trust rating score H towards peer j, and the other (N − H) peers have at most trust rating H towards peer j.
In our illustrated example, peer i first sorts all the obtained qualified replies by trust rating, then it does linear search over the sorted table and finally finds the H-Value equal to 41 as shown in Fig.4 . One special case needs to be considered. If there is no exactly H-Point, the approximate rank value will always be chosen as HValue. For instance, if only two peers replied with trust rating 95 and 90. The H-Value should be 2 instead of 90. It is a good way to avoid cheating. It indicates that too few recommendations are not reliable. So only when there are lots of responses and all the replied value is high, H-Value could be high. The detail algorithm to find H-Value is presented in [6] .
After the H-Trust aggregation has been done, the H-Value will be set as peer j's trust rating score in peer i's Local Trust Rating Table.
Peer Selection
Once a peer has computed trust ratings for the other peers interested in, it must decide which to choose to start the transaction or service. If there is just only one peer to provide the service, the question is whether to trust it with the service. If multiple peers are offering the same service, the question is whether to select the peer with the highest trust rating. Our solution is that the agent in the H-Trust system may select an appropriate peer based on whether the peer's trust rating is above or below a predefined selection threshold T s which is determined by the service characters.
Update of Trust Rating and Credibility Factors
After each service cycle, the service starter makes record of the service. The record is written back into start peer's LSHT. And the Local Trust Rating Table will be updated. In addition, the starter peer also updates its Local Credibility Table. Note that, in trust query phase, M peers replied the query. No matter whether one peer's response was selected to use or not, we increase the credibility factor of the peers who gave correct recommendation, and decrease the credibility of the peers who gave incorrect rating in Local Credibility Table.
Group Reputation Aggregation and Group Selection
The primary purpose of the group reputation is to help a job distributor to decide which available work group to assign the job. In an open environment, any bunch of peers can form a group and provide services. A service distributor needs to distinguish good service groups from bad ones. So group reputation mechanisms have been proposed and implemented to guide such group selection.
The definition of H-Trust group reputation aggregation algorithm is shown as follows (illustrated in Fig.5) . 
Definition 2 (Group Reputation Aggregation). A peer i has trust rating T iG = H G towards group G if H G of all the N G peers in group G have at least trust rating H G , and the other (N G − H G ) peers have at most trust rating H G in peer i.
In our illustrated example, after the service distributor peer obtain all group members' trust ratings for one group, the service distributor first sorts all the group members by trust rating, then it does linear search over the sorted table and finally finds the H-Value equal to 62 as shown in Fig.6 . After the group reputation aggregation has been done, the H-Value will be set as the work group's trust rating.
If multiple peer groups offer the same resources, the job distributor would likely go with the peer with the highest trust rating. The group selection can also be made according to a certain criterion such as the quality of service. However, it is important that the selection is not made according to a sole approach, which would result in overloading the trusted peers. Note that, even when many groups are available, an agent may decide to refuse all their service requests if all their reputations lie below the selection threshold T s . A selection threshold is necessary to protect against malicious spam responses. 
Simulation Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of HTrust through simulation. The simulation is developed using NetLogo, a popular multi-agent simulation tool in the AI community [31] . We use this simulator because its evaluating metrics meet our needs and it was used to model some existing schemes [24] . Thus, using NetLogo allows us to compare our algorithms with others.
The screenshot of the user interface of the simulator is shown in Fig.7 . On the left side, it lists a set of tuning bars that users can configure and adjust system parameters, including network size, percentage of malicious peers, percentage of low-credibility peers, and others. The simulated network is in the central panel, showing the P2P Desktop Grid network behavior. In the panel, the green shapes represent the normal peers and red ones the malicious peers. The circles represent peers with normal credits, while the triangles are peers with very low credibility that always make dishonest recommendations. On the right side, it lists three plotting panels that illustrate results as simulations evolve. The basic parameter setting and default values used in the simulation are summarized in Table 5 . The network is configured as 100 nodes and 500 nodes, with malicious peer percentage (α) varying from 10% to 40%. For honest peers, the initial trust value follows a normal distribution with mean µ r = 75 and variance σ The primary metrics we use to assess the performance of the reputation system are "the percentage of malicious services" and "the detection rate of malicious peers". The initial experiments are done by simulating a network with 100 peers where 10% of the peers are malicious and 10% of the peers have bad credibility. The simulation of a P2P grid network proceeds in simulation cycles: each simulation cycle is subdivided into a number of service distribution cycles. In each service cycle, a peer in the network may be actively submitting a job. When distributing a job, a peer waits for incoming responses, selects a most reputable peer to distribute the job. When a job cycle completes, the peer inserts a new transaction record to its History Table.
The simulation results are shown in Fig.8 . The computed trust ratings accurately reflect each peer's actual behavior. The number of malicious services starts to decrease with time.
As shown in Fig.8(c) , as time goes by, peers in the network gradually isolate malicious peers by votes and finally identify malicious peers. This procedure is also shown in Fig.9 (red dots represent malicious peers and big dots indicate peers that are identified as malicious peers).
In the second set of experiments, we keep the network size as 100 nodes where 10% of the peers have bad credibility. However, the percentage of malicious peers increases up to 40% which means there are lots of more malicious peers in the network. In Fig.10 , the simulation results demonstrate that the system functions well in the network when a large part of nodes are malicious.
To test the H-Trust performance in large-scale networks, we increase the network size to 500 peers in the third set of experiments. The percentage of malicious peers is set as 10% and 40% as we did in previous experiment. The simulation results are shown in Fig.11 and Fig.12 .
We observe that in a larger network, H-Trust still functions well and the convergence time increases in a reasonable range duo to more iteration complexity Not available High message overhead, high computational overhead [8] Moderate [8] PowerTrust Global selective aggregation reputation system
Medium, faster than EigenTrust [10] Medium message overhead (lower than EigenTrust [10] ), medium computation overhead
High [10] GossipTrust Global full aggregation reputation system Fast, log 2 N [11] Medium message overhead (average log 2 N [11] ), low computation overhead
High [11] FuzzyTrust Global selective aggregation reputation system
Medium, Increasing linearly with network size [12] Median message overhead, Medium computational overhead more than 99% [12] H-Trust Personalized selective aggregation trust system
Medium [5] Medium message overhead, low computation overhead [5] more than 99% [5] Note: This summary is presented to understand each scheme better, not for comparison purpose. It is hard to compare due to different system configurations.
caused by larger-scale networks. Both results demonstrate that the H-Trust system detects most of the malicious peers after aggregation iterations. On average, the peers transmit modest messages and incur acceptable communication overheads. Table 6 shows a summary of the H-Trust system and some existing trust management schemes in terms of accuracy and efficiency. The results show that H-Trust scheme is efficient in trust aggregation. Computational overhead in H-Trust is reasonable. H-Trust convergence time and message overhead increase slowly with network size growing, demonstrating its high scalability. The comparison results also show that H-Trust scheme performs well even when a large number of peers are malicious.
Conclusion
We presented a personalized selective aggregation based group reputation system H-Trust for collaborative resource sharing and execution in P2P desktop grids. Simulation results demonstrated that H-Trust can quickly identify malicious peers under system uncertainties and incomplete information about states of large-scale distributed systems and applications. As a result, H-Trust provides an efficient and robust means to prevent spreading of malicious content. H-Trust allows individual peers to compute local trust values for other users or groups using their own inference algorithm of choice, and thus can be used to implement a variety of distributed and heterogeneous policies. The ongoing work is to further extend H-Trust by considering incentive mechanisms and peer anonymity and evaluate the performance of H-Trust via real-world experiments.
